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Searching for the Constitutional
Core of Access to Justice
Melina Buckley*

I. INTRODUCTION
Access to justice is a large multi-faceted concept with broad policy
implications and is also a constitutional commitment central to our legal
system. In its largest sense, access to justice encompasses both a
procedural component, i.e., the availability of a range of formal and
informal avenues to resolve disputes and prevent conflict, and a
substantive component, i.e., a just, fair or equitable outcome. From this
policy perspective the concept of access to justice defies precise
definition but includes a range of programs and initiatives e.g., programs
to reduce cost and delay of dispute resolution processes, public legal
education, community mediation services, and so on. However, access to
justice is also a legal principle that underpins our justice system and has
a narrower, restricted definition relating specifically to access to the
courts, effective remedies, and legal services. In order to distinguish
the legal principle from the broad policy concept, I refer to the former as
the constitutional core of access to justice.
In this paper, I argue that the constitutional core of access to justice
is susceptible to precise definition by the courts, but that at present the
judicial enterprise of refining and giving contemporary meaning to
access to justice is obfuscated by debate surrounding the broader policy
concept. This obfuscation occurs because the duality of broad policy and
narrow legal principle plays into concerns over the respective roles of
governments and the courts to ensure access to justice which brings the
justiciability of access to justice claims into question. A claim is
justiciable when its subject matter is a real and substantial legal
controversy that is amenable to judicial determination. Justiciability
involves two interrelated issues: (1) the competence and legitimacy of
the court to hear the claim; and (2) the sufficiency of the factual basis for
*
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the claim (the claim cannot be hypothetical, speculative, abstract or
moot).1 Governments clearly have the primary responsibility for
ensuring access to justice, but courts too have a role in determining
whether barriers to the justice system offend the Constitution Act, 19822
and to provide responsive legal remedies where constitutional breaches
are found. The legal profession also plays a central role in ensuring
access to justice, but this obligation is of a different nature given that it is
mandated by professional responsibility rather than the Constitution.
Judges have become quite vocal in raising their concerns over access
to justice in public forums and these voices have become more urgent in
the past few years. It is instructive to examine a few of these judicial
comments in light of recent jurisprudence and to consider the underlying
views regarding the respective roles and responsibilities of governments,
the courts and the legal profession in ensuring access to justice. In early
2007 in the Little Sisters case, a majority of the Supreme Court of
Canada downplayed the constitutional importance of the principle of
access to justice ruling that access to justice concerns are not
“paramount” in a court’s decision to award advance costs in order to
ensure that impecunious litigants with meritorious public interest claims
can proceed.3 A few months later in Christie, the Court unanimously
rejected, in a relatively cursory manner, a claim that a provincial tax on
legal services offended the constitutional principle of access to justice.4
And yet in August 2007, McLachlin C.J.C. declared that access to justice
is a “basic right” for Canadians and called upon governments, lawyers
and judges to address this crisis.5
In her remarks, she emphasized the access problems experienced by
“middle-class Canadians” and noted that “[t]he justice system risks
losing the confidence of the public when ‘wealthy corporations,’ or the
poor, who qualify for legal aid, have the means to use the court system”
while the middle-class can only do so at an unacceptable cost.6 While the
1
Lorne Sossin, Boundaries of Judicial Review: The Law of Justiciability in Canada
(Scarborough, Ont.: Carswell, 1999).
2
Being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Constitution”].
3
Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v. Canada (Commissioner of Customs and
Revenue), [2007] S.C.J. No. 2, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 38, 2007 SCC 2, at para. 35 (S.C.C.), per Bastarache
and Lebel JJ. for the majority [hereinafter “Little Sisters”].
4
British Columbia (Attorney General) v. Christie, [2007] S.C.J. No. 21, [2007] 1 S.C.R.
873, 2007 SCC 21 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Christie”].
5
Tracey Tyler, “Access to Justice a ‘Basic Right’” The Toronto Star, August 12, 2007,
online: The Toronto Star <http://www.thestar.com/article/245548>.
6
Id.
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Chief Justice’s remarks are an important and welcome recognition of the
enormous difficulties faced by individuals in accessing the justice
system, they are problematic in two important respects. First, they
overstate the availability of legal aid to poor people and secondly they
suggest, especially when read together with the Court’s decisions in
Little Sisters and Christie, that the solutions to denials of the “basic right
of access to justice” exist solely outside of the courtroom.
A similar juxtaposition can be made of the views expressed by
Brenner C.J. of the Supreme Court of British Columbia inside and
outside of the courtroom. Chief Justice Brenner has been actively
involved in co-chairing a multi-year initiative to improve access to civil
justice in the province.7 Recently, serving in his capacity as a guest
editor to The Vancouver Sun for a special issue on how to construct a
“truly civil society in British Columbia”, he wrote about the importance
of access to justice and the provincial government’s initiatives in this
regard. Chief Justice Brenner concluded his contribution with an
eloquent plea for “commitment by governments to provide adequate
levels of legal aid”:
But while these measures will help, we must not forget the particular
challenges faced by the poor and the disadvantaged. These British
Columbians face very long odds when trying to identify and solve their
problems. Many are simply too ill-equipped to understand, let alone to
try to enforce their rights. When their adversary is a government or
large organization, obtaining redress can prove virtually impossible.
For these disadvantaged British Columbians we have a duty to provide
adequate levels of civil legal aid. Most would agree that this is a moral
obligation; the Supreme Court of Canada has ruled that civil legal aid
in some circumstances is also a constitutional obligation. Clearly
governments must now recognize this and ensure that civil as well as
criminal legal aid is available in appropriate cases to the poor and the
disadvantaged.8

These remarks are evidence of Brenner C.J.’s clear and active
commitment to improving access to justice and his recognition of the
huge barriers to justice faced by poor persons who are the most
7
See Civil Justice Reform Working Group, Effective and Affordable Civil Justice —
Report of the Civil Justice Reform Working Group to the Civil Justice Review Task Force (British
Columbia: November 2006).
8
Don Brenner, “Legal Aid Needs Help from Government” The Vancouver Sun, April 5,
2008, at C-7.
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vulnerable and socially excluded group in Canada. However, this same
judge had earlier dismissed, at a very preliminary stage, the Canadian
Bar Association’s (“CBA”) public interest action seeking a declaration
that the civil legal aid regime in British Columbia is unconstitutional and
that there is a constitutional right to legal aid in civil justice matters
affecting the fundamental interests of people living in poverty.9 He
dismissed the action on the basis that the CBA could not be granted
public interest standing and that, in any event, the claim did not disclose
a reasonable cause of action.10 The central underlying theme of his
reasons for dismissing the case appears to be that governmental acts that
have strong policy dimensions “cannot be the subject of public interest
standing to bring a Charter claim”.11
The striking contrast between these public exhortations to
governments to act on the one hand and judicial reticence and deference
to government in the courtroom on the other, frame the current fate of
civil legal aid in Canada. Legal aid schemes are a fundamental
component of access to justice initiatives in Anglo-American countries
and arguably the most important mechanism to improve access for the
most disadvantaged individuals and groups. However, the provision of
civil legal aid is extremely limited in most provinces and almost nonexistent in others.12 The dire state of legal aid in Canada led the CBA to
begin treating it as an access to justice crisis in 1992 and to take active
steps to lobby for increased legal aid funding and effective mechanisms
for the delivery of legal aid services. In the intervening years, the state of
civil legal aid provision has generally declined and this decline is in
large measure attributable to the diminishing contribution from the
federal government and the shift in funding mechanisms from a costsharing regime to a block transfer.13 Given the worsening access to
9

Canadian Bar Assn. v. British Columbia, [2006] B.C.J. No. 2015, [2007] 1 W.W.R. 331;
144 C.R.R. (2d) 291, 2006 BCSC 1342 (B.C.S.C.) [hereinafter “CBA case”]. The CBA’s statement
of claim and other material relating to the case are available on the CBA’s website at:
<http://www.cba.org/CBA/Advocacy/legalaid/default.aspx>.
10
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, although on the narrower grounds that there
was no reasonable cause of action because the pleadings failed to state adequate material facts:
Canadian Bar Assn. v. British Columbia, [2008] B.C.J. No. 350, 290 D.L.R. (4th) 617, 2008 BCCA
92 (B.C.C.A.).
11
Lorne Sossin, “The Justice of Access: Who Should Have Standing to Challenge the
Constitutional Adequacy of Legal Aid?” (2007) 40 U.B.C. L. Rev. 727, at 729.
12
Quebec and Ontario have by far the most comprehensive civil legal aid schemes, but
there are still important limitations and inadequacies.
13
The 1996 change from funding under the Canada Assistance Plan pursuant to the
Canada Assistance Plan Act (R.S.C. 1970, c. C-1) to block fund transfers first under the Canada
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justice crisis and federal and provincial governments’ lack of response to
its public advocacy efforts, the CBA decided that its only recourse was
to initiate litigation.14 To date, the CBA’s claim has become wedged in
the quagmire of debate over institutional competence and the respective
responsibilities of government and courts to ensure access to justice. It is
important to continually remind ourselves that it is the fundamental
rights of poor persons that are ignored and further trammelled in this war
of words and resultant inaction.
In my view, a way forward can be found by disassociating the broad
policy concept of access to justice from the narrower legal and
constitutional principle. It is only this narrower meaning that gives rise
to legal obligations and hence is within the purview of the courts. With
this in mind, I set out three approaches to defining the constitutional core
of access to justice: (1) access to the courts and the rule of law; (2)
access to counsel and the right to a fair trial; and (3) access to justice and
the equal benefit and protection of the law. Following this brief and
preliminary exposition, I discuss Canadian Bar Assn. v. British
Columbia15 as an example of a case that offers the opportunity to search
for and further refine the constitutional core of access to justice if it can
be untangled from the web of justiciability concerns.

II. ACCESS TO THE COURTS AND THE RULE OF LAW
The rule of law has been recognized by Canadian courts as a
fundamental constitutional principle that establishes the foundation for
our justice system.16 The rule of law is ubiquitous and so it may appear
amorphous but, like air, its absence or denial has concrete, measurable
effects. Our perception of what the rule of law is and of its importance is
sharpest when it is absent, in situations where law does not in fact rule.
Health and Social Transfer and now under the Canada Social Transfer pursuant to the Federal
Provincial Fiscal Arrangements Act (R.S.C. 1985, c. F-8).
14
Susan McGrath, “CBA Launches Test Case to Challenge Constitutional Right to Civil
Legal Aid”, online: The Canadian Bar Association <http://www.cba.org/CBA/News/2005_Releases/
2005-06-20_remarks.aspx>.
15
CBA Case, supra, note 9; appeal denied, supra, note 10.
16
Roncarelli v. Duplessis, [1959] S.C.J. No. 1, [1959] S.C.R. 121, at 142 (S.C.C.);
Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] S.C.J. No. 61, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, at para. 70 (S.C.C.).
The rule of law is expressly acknowledged by the preamble to the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Scheudle B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”], and implicitly recognized in the preamble to the Constitution
Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3: see Reference re Manitoba Language Rights, [1985] S.C.J.
No. 36, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721, at 750 (S.C.C.).
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The Supreme Court of Canada has summarized its jurisprudence on the
content of the rule of law17 as embracing three principles:
(1) The law “is supreme over officials of the government as well as
private individuals, and thereby preclusive of the influence of
arbitrary power”.18
(2) The requirement for “the creation and maintenance of an actual
order of positive laws which preserves and embodies the more
general principle of normative order.”19
(3) The requirement that the relationship between the state and the
individual be regulated by law.20
The first approach to defining the constitutional core of access to
justice is to focus on the implicit link between access and the rule of law.
From this perspective, the emphasis is on access to the courts and to
effective remedies. It is only when access is assured that the courts can
play their primordial role as guardians of the justice system and the rule
of law. The rule of law necessarily requires that every person, regardless
of wealth or circumstance, be entitled to justice in a court of law. Part of
the substantive enjoyment of every right is that one is able to enforce it
through the courts. The right of access to the courts is a long-standing
historical tradition in the common law and is enshrined in the Magna
Carta.21
The most robust judicial pronouncement of the inextricable
relationship between the rule of law and access to the courts to date was
made by Dickson C.J. in B.C.G.E.U. v. British Columbia (Attorney
General):
… Of what value are the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the
Charter if a person is delayed or denied access to a court of competent
jurisdiction in order to vindicate them? How can the courts
independently maintain the rule of law and effectively discharge the
duties imposed by the Charter if court access is hindered, impeded or
denied? The Charter protections would become illusory, the entire
Charter undermined.
17
British Columbia v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd., [2005] S.C.J. No. 50, [2005] 2
S.C.R. 473, 2005 SCC 49, at para. 58 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Imperial Tobacco”].
18
Reference re Manitoba Language Rights, supra, note 16, at para. 59.
19
Id., at para. 60.
20
Reference re Secession of Quebec, supra, note 16, at para. 71.
21
The Magna Carta (1215) provides inter alia: “To none will we sell, to none will we deny
or delay, right or justice.”
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There cannot be a rule of law without access, otherwise the rule of law
is replaced by a rule of men and women who decide who shall and who
shall not have access to justice. …22

While BCGEU is often presented as a case purely about physical
access to the courts, it should be noted that intangible barriers to
accessing justice were also at issue in that case, namely an “obligation of
conscience not to breach the picket line”.23 More specifically, Dickson
C.J.C. quoted with approval a passage from the Court of Appeal decision
referring to “interference from whatever source”.24 Other cases have held
that the rule of law protects access to the courts beyond physical access
and gives rise to the constitutional obligation to set aside court hearing
fees,25 and to order government to provide for fee waivers for
impecunious litigants.26 Government actions that result in barriers to
access to the courts cannot be tolerated because recourse to the courts is
a constitutional right and not simply a choice an individual makes in
resolving civil disputes:
Citizens wronged, or believing themselves to have been wronged, or
denied, or believing themselves to have been denied rights to which
they are entitled, and whether the alleged transgressor is another citizen
or the state itself, apart from self help remedies, will see little
alternative than to seek to have the judicial component of our
Constitution affirm their rights. Self help remedies are unacceptable,
and therefore there is the practical compulsion to seek redress in the
courts. The respondent’s stated position that a litigant makes a choice
to go to court and therefore there is no compulsion, fails to recognize
the inherent right, and in some cases need, for all of us to seek redress
and relief. Although private resolution models have been developed,
and provide a valuable forum for resolving certain types of disputes,
they cannot provide remedies in cases involving fundamental rights

22
BCGEU v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1988] S.C.J. No. 76, [1988] 2 S.C.R.
214 at 229-30 (S.C.C.).
23
Id., at para. 29.
24
Id., at 230.
25
Pleau v. Nova Scotia (Supreme Court, Prothonotary), [1998] N.S.J. No. 526, 186 N.S.R.
(2d) 1 (N.S.S.C.).
26
Pearson v. Canada, [2000] F.C.J. No. 1444, 195 F.T.R. 31 (F.C.T.D.), affd [2002] F.C.J.
No. 1291, 2002 FCA 326 (F.C.A.), leave to appeal refused, [2002] S.C.C.A. No. 459 (S.C.C.);
Polewsky v. Home Hardware Stores Ltd., [2003] O.J. No. 2908 (Ont. Div. Ct.), leave to appeal
granted, [2004] O.J. No. 954 (Ont. C.A.). In both cases, the courts found a common law as well as a
constitutional right to proceed in forma pauperis, that is, as an indigent person, without incurring
court fees.
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and freedoms. In respect to accessing the courts, there is a practical and
real “compulsion”.27

The Supreme Court of Canada was invited to consider the
contemporary meaning and legal requirements of the fundamental
guarantee of access to justice as it relates to and supports rule of law in
Christie.28 The legal issue was whether the provincial tax on legal
services, which had been demonstrated to hinder the access by lowincome persons to legal counsel, was unconstitutional in that it violated
the principle of access to justice and thereby offended the rule of law.
The British Columbia courts had struck down the tax as unconstitutional
in certain circumstances. The Chambers judge had limited the effect of
her order to relieving the tax burden from low-income Canadians
defined in relation to eligibility for certain types of legal aid.29 The Court
of Appeal took a different tack in emphasizing the type of legal service
at issue rather than the characteristics of the client in determining where
the tax had unconstitutional effects. After a careful review of the
jurisprudence and scholarly commentary, Newbury J.A., writing for the
majority, settled on the following definition:
… I propose as a working definition the meaning which in my opinion
represents the most basic, or core, aspects of access to justice as a
constitutional principle — i.e., reasonable and effective access to
courts of law and the opportunity to obtain legal services from
qualified professionals, that are related to the determination and
interpretation of legal rights and obligations by courts of law or other
independent tribunals.30

The Court of Appeal’s remedy flowed directly from this wording
and it struck down the tax on legal services to the extent that they
applied to legal services related to the determination and interpretation of
legal rights and obligations by courts of law or other independent
tribunals.
The Supreme Court of Canada reversed the lower courts concluding
that the text of the Constitution, the jurisprudence and the historical
understanding of the rule of law did not support such a broad general
27

Pleau, supra, note 25, at para. 22.
Supra, note 4.
29
Christie v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [2005] B.C.J. No. 217, 250 D.L.R. (4th)
728 (B.C.S.C.), per Koeningsberg J.
30
Christie v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [2005] B.C.J. No. 2745, 262 D.L.R.
(4th) 51, at para. 30 (B.C.C.A.).
28
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right to counsel. The Court did not “foreclose the possibility that a right
to counsel may be recognized in specific and varied situations” but at the
same time, it reiterated that there is no “general constitutional right to
counsel in proceedings before courts and tribunals dealing with rights
and obligations.”31 The Court’s reasons conflate Mr. Christie’s claim that
the tax was unconstitutional because it hindered access to justice with a
claim that the principle of access to justice requires that state-funded
counsel be provided in all circumstances. In doing so, the Court
transformed the negative claim that the state should not impose a burden
on access to counsel, into a more onerous claim for a positive obligation
for state-funded access to counsel. The Court summarily dismissed the
argument that the right to non-interference with access to counsel,
including freedom from state-imposed barriers that hinder or deny access
to counsel, has a much broader ambit than the right to state-funded
counsel under current Canadian jurisprudence.
In its reasons, the Court failed to engage in a close examination of
the actual impact of the tax on poor persons as demonstrated by the
evidentiary record. Instead it decried the lack of evidence about how
much it would cost to provide legal aid to everyone in all
circumstances.32 This is a phantom concern created by the Court. An
analogy that demonstrates the problematic nature of the Court’s
approach can be made with the Pleau33 and Polewsky34 cases cited above,
which deal with the unconstitutionality of hearing fees and lack of
waiver provisions for filing fees for impecunious litigants. In these
cases, the courts did not take such an all-or-nothing approach; they did
not find that all court fees violated the principle of access to justice or
that all filing fees had to be waived because some individuals could not
pay. Rather, they looked at the impact of these government-imposed
barriers to access and provided a tailored remedy. These cases recognize
that the impact on the individual whose access is impaired or denied is
the same regardless of whether the nature or source of the barrier is
physical or economic.
Having created a scenario in which “the logical result would be a
constitutionally mandated legal aid scheme for virtually all legal

31
32
33
34

Christie, supra, note 4, at para. 27.
Id., at para. 14.
Supra, note 25.
Supra, note 26.
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proceedings”,35 the Court was able to sidestep an examination of the
ways in which the right of access to justice flows by necessary
implication from the three principles underlying the rule of law as
articulated by the Court in Imperial Tobacco.36 The supremacy of the
law, an actual order of positive laws preserving and embodying the
principle of normative order, and the regulation of the relationship
between the state and the individual by these laws can only be assured
where there is real access to the courts. No law, not even the written
Constitutional text, can be given effect if access to justice is denied.
The abstract right of access to the courts under the rule of law must
be grounded in the real experiences of individuals upon whom the
burden of this tax fall. The uncontroverted evidence in Christie
demonstrated the uneven and discriminatory impact of the tax on legal
services on low-income persons. The rule of law is particularly important
for low-income persons because as a group their underprivileged status
makes them particularly vulnerable and most in need of protection from
arbitrary power, for the preservation of the normative order, and for
protection from the state.37
The question facing the Court was whether the tax on legal services
operated as a lock on the courtroom door for individuals of modest
means. The Supreme Court did not answer the question of whether the tax
amounted to a barrier to the courts nor take into account that the
disadvantaged situation of low-income persons was exacerbated by the
tax on legal services. While leaving open a small window for claims to
access to counsel in specified circumstances under the rule of law, the
Court suggested that the preferred approach is to bring access to justice
claims through right to counsel claims under the Charter. Needless to
say, this would not have helped Mr. Christie had he lived to proceed
further with his claim given that his claim did not involve, in any shape
or form, an application for state-funded counsel.

35

Christie, supra, note 4, at para. 13.
Supra, note 17.
37
Patricia Hughes, “Recognizing Substantive Equality as a Foundational Constitutional
Principle” (1999) 22 Dalhousie L.J. 5, at 33; Janet Mosher, “Poverty Law – A Case Study” in
Ontario Legal Aid Review, Report of the Ontario Legal Aid Review: A Blueprint for Publicly
Funded Legal Services, vol. 3 (Toronto: Ontario Legal Aid Review, 1997), at 915.
36

(2008), 42 S.C.L.R. (2d)
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III. ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND THE RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL
A second path in the search for the constitutional core for access to
justice focuses on access to counsel as it relates to the right to a fair trial.
In criminal matters, Canadian courts employed their inherent powers to
ensure a fair trial by ordering that it will stay proceedings in a specific
case unless the government funds legal representation for the accused
long before the entrenchment of the Charter.38 This traditional approach
has been maintained since the adoption of the Charter. Courts continue
to find an ad hoc right to publicly funded counsel in particular
circumstances, now relating it specifically to the protection afforded by
the guarantee of the right to life, liberty and security of the person
protected by section 7 of the Charter. In each case, a trial judge will
review whether or not counsel is required for an individual to have a fair
trial.39 Three main factors are taken into account in making this
determination: (1) the seriousness of the charge and its consequences;
(2) the complexity of the case; and (3) the capacity of the accused.40
The jurisprudence has been developed in the criminal context, but a
similar approach was extended to child apprehension proceedings by the
Supreme Court of Canada in G. (J.).41 This jurisprudence has elucidated
an important qualitative standard to be incorporated into the
constitutional core of access to justice. This constitutional standard is
that of “meaningful” and “effective” participation in legal proceedings
involved in asserting or defending important legal interests.42

IV. ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND EQUAL BENEFIT AND
EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW
A third route along which we can seek the constitutional core of
access to justice follows from the norm of equality that is inherent in the
concept itself — the understood, if not always spoken or acknowledged,
prefix of “equal” access to justice. This route is the less-well-travelled
one. It brings together the two earlier paths focusing on access to the
38
See for example, R. v. Ewing, [1974] B.C.J. No. 846, 18 C.C.C. (2d) 356 (B.C.C.A.), and
R. v. White, [1976] A.J. No. 574, 32 C.C.C. (2d) 478 (Alta. T.D.).
39
R. v. Rowbotham, [1988] O.J. No. 271, 41 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (Ont. C.A.).
40
Id.
41
New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v. G. (J.), [1999] S.C.J.
No. 47, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 46 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “G. (J.)”].
42
Id., at paras. 73, 80, 81, 83, 84, 85, 89, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 125.
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courts and access to counsel, but sees these two approaches to access to
justice through the prism of equality rather than the construct of the right
to a fair trial. At its most basic, the rule of law describes the state of a
society where law is supreme, that is, where the highest representative of
the Crown as well as the most humble citizen must act in accordance
with law as interpreted by the courts. As confirmed by Dicey in his early
treatise on English constitutional law, the rule of law ensures and
guarantees equality before the law.43
The norm of substantive equality is a primary value within and
across Canadian society and is closely related to the principle of the rule
of law. The primordial quality of this human rights norm was endorsed
in ringing tones by Cory J. in Vriend: “The rights enshrined in s. 15(1) of
the Charter are fundamental to Canada. They reflect the fondest dreams,
the highest hopes and finest aspirations of Canadian society.”44 These
principles are inextricably linked in a constitutional democracy and in
the inherent values of the dignity of the human person, the commitment
to social justice and equality and the respect for cultural and group
identity.45 Equality rights have been characterized as “the broadest of all
guarantees. They apply to and support all other rights guaranteed by the
Charter.”46
The primordial status of substantive equality is acknowledged in a
number of governmental actions and commitments. The advancement of
equality is a national policy in Canada. It is the subject of statutes in
every jurisdiction and equality guarantees are a central part of Canada’s
Constitution. In addition, Canada as a nation, is signatory to a number of
international human rights treaties which commit us to the advancement
of equality for all residents. The equality guarantees were included in the
Charter to satisfy both Canada’s own commitment to advancing equality
and to meet international obligations.
Canadian courts have not yet considered in-depth the relationship
between access to justice and the right to equal benefit and equal
protection of the law. However, the parameters of equal access to justice
43

Roncarelli v. Duplessis, supra, note 16. For a summary of Dicey’s rule of law principles
see A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 10th ed. (London:
MacMillan & Co., 1959), at 202-203, cited in P. Hogg & C. Zwibel, “The Rule of Law in the
Supreme Court of Canada” (2005) 55 U.T.L.J. 715, at note 1.
44
Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] S.C.J. No. 29, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493, at para. 67 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “Vriend”].
45
R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, at para. 64 (S.C.C.).
46
Law Society of British Columbia v. Andrews, [1989] S.C.J. No. 6, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143, at
185 (S.C.C.).
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and the related obligations on government is a well-trodden avenue in
the international legal arena. Canada’s international human rights
obligations confirm the primacy of equality, and serve to shed light on
the requirements of the principle of access to justice.
Articles 2, 14(1) and 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights are the key guarantors of equal access to justice in the
international human rights framework.47 Article 14(1) declares that “all
persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals”, and establishes a
right to a fair hearing. The right to equality before the courts in Article
14(1) is reinforced by Articles 2 and 26. Article 2(1) commits states
parties to respect and ensure to all individuals the rights set out in the
ICCPR, without distinction. Article 26 provides that “all persons are
equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the
equal protection of the law”, and requires that “the law shall prohibit any
discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective
protection against discrimination”.48 The right to equality before the
courts and tribunals under Article 14(1) of the ICCPR is understood to
apply not only to criminal matters, but also to litigation concerning
rights and obligations of a civil nature. The Human Rights Committee
has interpreted the concept of a fair hearing in a civil “suit at law” as
requiring a number of conditions including “equality of arms” with the
opposing side.49
It is a fundamental principle of international human rights law that
commitments to rights entail effective access to the courts to seek an
effective remedy for rights violations. Moreover, it is clear that the duty
to ensure that people do have access to the courts to seek remedies for
rights violations, imposes obligations on governments to provide rights
adjudication mechanisms that are accessible. Article 2(2) of the ICCPR
obligates governments to take the necessary steps to “adopt such
legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the
rights” contained in the Covenant. Further, through Article 2(3)(a) of the
ICCPR, every state party undertakes “to ensure that any person whose

47

G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966),
999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force for Canada March 23, 1976 (“ICCPR”).
48
“General Comment No. 18” in Compilation of General Comments and General
Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies: (UN DOC. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.3 (1997)).
49
Morael v. France, HRC Dec. 207/1986, UN DOC. Supp. No. 40 (A/44/40), at para. 9.3
(1989).
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rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have an
effective remedy”.50
Together Articles 2(2), 14(1) and 26 of the ICCPR require
substantively equal access to the courts, and prohibit any government
action that may have a deterrent effect on the ability of individuals to
pursue a remedy before the courts. Conditions that have the effect of
preventing individuals from effectively exercising their rights are
considered to violate the ICCPR. For example, the Human Rights
Committee has held that a rigid duty under law to award costs to a
winning party, without discretion to consider its implications for “access
to court” by rights claimants violates Article 14(1) in conjunction with
Article 2 of the ICCPR.51
It is also understood by other international treaty bodies that the duty
of state parties to fulfil the obligation to provide effective remedies for
rights violations imposes an obligation on governments to remove
economic and other barriers to the effective presentation of a claim. For
example, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights Committee explained in General Comment No. 16 that the duty
of state parties to fulfil rights includes an obligation on governments to
“take steps to ensure that in practice, men and women enjoy their
economic, social and cultural rights on a basis of equality”, and that such
steps should include establishing “appropriate venues for redress such as
courts and tribunals or administrative mechanisms that are accessible to
all on the basis of equality, including the poorest and most
disadvantaged and marginalized men and women” (emphasis added).52
Within the rubric of the rule of law today, equal access to justice
does not mean Diceyan formal equality, that is, mere recognition of
everyone’s similar position in the justice system and its equal application
to everyone. In addition to the international human rights norms cited
above, jurisprudence under section 15 of the Charter and human rights
legislation must be considered as part of the interpretive backdrop and
for ascertaining the core of access to justice. Canadian courts have been
unequivocal in eschewing a “thin and impoverished” narrow formalistic
50
(1948), at Articles 8, 10 (“UDHR”); ICCPR, Articles 2(2), (3); Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III), UN GAOR, 3d Sess., Supp. No. 13, Doc. A/810.
51
Äärelä and Näkkäläjärvi v. Finland, Communication No. 779/1997, 24 October 2001,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/73/D/779/1997, at para 7.2.
52
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“CESCR”), “General Comment
No. 16: The Equal Right of Men and Women to the Enjoyment of all Economic, and Social and
Cultutal Rights” (2005), at para. 21.
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interpretation of the equality rights both in constitutional and quasiconstitutional law. Rather it has unhesitatingly embraced a rich,
purposive, substantive guarantee of equality, which encompasses the
duty to promote a more equal society and an obligation to take into
account the possible impact of measures on “already disadvantaged
classes of persons”.53
The constitutional core of access to justice hinges on a robust
understanding of the right to equal benefit and equal protection of law.
These legal norms are well developed under international human rights
law and include the proposition that meaningful access to the courts is,
in many circumstances, contingent upon legal representation. The mere
right to appear in court — that is, a right to self-representation — is in
many cases a meaningless right given the complexity of modern law. In
many, if not most, circumstances, individuals require legal assistance in
order to participate meaningfully in legal proceedings.54 Even in cases
where the state is not a party, power disparities between parties, left
unaddressed, can infringe the right to equal benefit of the law.
The law defines the rights and obligations of individuals and
governments. The justice system provides the procedures and decision
making authority by which disputes, including disputes with governments,
can be resolved. It is axiomatic that the substantive content of the law,
the rights and obligations, are hollow unless a means is available to
ensure that these rights can be exercised equally by all those who they
are intended to protect:
The law, through its promise of equality before it to all those subject to
it, suggests that the benefits it delivers are equally open to all subjects.
To the extent that any subject is unable to discover his or her
entitlements because of an inability to state adequately the case for
entitlement, a silent political choice is made which deems that person
unworthy of the benefit. The choice has to remain silent because to
53
Ontario (Human Rights Commission) v. Simpsons-Sears, [1985] S.C.J. No. 74, [1985] 2
S.C.R. 536 (S.C.C.); Law Society of British Columbia v. Andrews, supra, note 45; Eldridge v.
British Columbia (Attorney General), [1997] S.C.J. No. 86, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624 (S.C.C.); Vriend,
supra, note 44; British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v. BCGSEU,
[1999] S.C.J. No. 46, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “BCGSEU”]; Law v. Canada (Minister
of Employment and Immigration), [1999] S.C.J. No. 12, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497 (S.C.C.).
54
Several United States decisions recognize this point. For example, the United States
Court of Appeal in Davis v. Page, 618 F.2d 374, at 385 (5th Cir. 1980) stated: “We realize that it
cannot be said there is meaningful access to the judicial process until all serious litigants are
represented by counsel.” Both the majority and minority reasons in G. (J.), supra, note 41, also used
the terminology of “meaningful” and “effective” participation in legal proceedings (id., at para. 83,
per Lamer C.J.C.; para. 125, per L’Heureux-Dubé J.).
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bring it into the open—to make it public—is to make it starkly clear
that the promise of equality is empty. 55

Thus, while the positive obligation on governments to provide legal
assistance and representation in some circumstances is not the only
means to ensure access to justice, it appears clear that is one important
facet of the constitutional core of this principle.

V. THE CBA TEST CASE
This brief exposition on the three approaches to refining the
constitutional core of the access to justice leads us to a point of
convergence. While access to justice means more than access to a
lawyer, given the pervasiveness and complexity of both substantive and
procedural law in contemporary Canadian society, access to a lawyer is a
necessary element of access to justice in many circumstances. To date,
the courts have found that the situations in which governments have a
positive obligation to provide counsel are best ascertained through
individual case specific applications. The validity of this approach was
reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Christie.56 However, this case-bycase approach is problematic in a number of respects, notably that it
places an unfair legal burden on disadvantaged litigants and immunizes
many aspects of government action from constitutional review.
The CBA has initiated litigation57 on the issue of the right to civil
legal aid that attempts to overcome the problems inherent in the
individual right to counsel paradigm, and to further delineate the
contours of the constitutional core of access to justice.58 The CBA claims
that British Columbia, Canada and the Legal Services Society are in
violation of the Constitution through the operation of the government
legal aid scheme, which systematically denies access to justice, and
systemically discriminates against poor persons who are unable to access
legal representation in matters affecting their fundamental interests. The
claim sets out the ways in which the scheme infringes constitutional
rights by excluding coverage for family law, poverty law, immigration
55
David Dyzenhaus, “Normative Justifications for the Provision of Legal Aid” in John D.
McCamus, M.J. Trebilcock, L.Newton et al., Report of the Ontario Legal Aid Review: A Blueprint
for Publicly Funded Legal Services (Toronto: Queen’s Printer, 1997).
56
[2007] S.C.J. No. 21, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 873, 2007 SCC 21 (S.C.C.).
57
Canadian Bar Assn. v. British Columbia, [2006] B.C.J. No. 2015, [2007] 1 W.W.R. 331,
144 C.R.R. (2d) 291, 2006 BCSC 1342 (B.C.S.C.).
58
Online at: CBA <http://www.cba.org/CBA/Advocacy/legalaid/default.aspx>.
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and refugee law, and prison law matters and/or severely restricting legal
assistance in these areas. It sets out the harms experienced by poor
persons as a result of the exclusions and restrictions in the government
scheme. In particular, the claim alleges that the civil legal aid regime in
B.C. is inconsistent with the Canadian Constitution because it violates
the rights guaranteed by sections 7, 15 and 28 of the Charter, section 36
of the Constitution Act, 1982, and unwritten constitutional principles (the
rule of law, the norm of constitutional equality and the independence of
the judiciary), as informed by Canada’s obligations under international
human rights law.
We refer to the CBA case as a “systemic case” because it alleges
constitutional infringements and harms that are experienced by a group
of individuals that result from systemic defects in the regime, rather than
from improper individual decisions or actions. The action is pled on the
basis of material facts of these systemic breaches. At trial, proof of these
systemic facts would be brought through evidence of individuals who
have experienced denials of access to justice attributable to the legal aid
regime to illustrate the constitutional frailties in the legal aid scheme, as
well as evidence of the patterns of denials and their consequences for
poor people as a group. This can be distinguished from the more
“typical” constitutional action in which a claim is framed by the
individual fact pattern of a litigant or litigants. A successful individual
right to counsel application gives rise to an individual remedy of the
appointment of government funded counsel. However, if the CBA case
is successful in establishing its claims, it would result in systemic
remedies, that is declarations of unconstitutionality and ancillary relief
that would oblige governments to ensure that the legal aid scheme in
B.C. fully complies with the Canadian Constitution.
To date, this action has foundered because of concerns about the
justiciability of the novel systemic claim pleaded by the CBA. In this
final section, I set out the rationale for the CBA case and the fate of the
case to date.
1. The Rationale for a Systemic Claim
In the introduction, I alluded to the wholesale inadequacies of civil
legal aid and the harms experienced by poor people who are unable to
secure meaningful and effective access to the justice system. As a result
of the failure of government actions, poor people are left to deal without
assistance with complex legal procedures that affect their vital interests.
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Many suffer devastating consequences including heightened risks to
physical and emotional security, to the ability to maintain relationships
with their children, and to the ability to access an adequate standard of
living.
The absence or inadequacy of legal aid affects poor people as a
group as well as other groupings over-represented within this social
class, i.e., Aboriginal persons, persons with disabilities, the young, the
aged, women (particularly women who are single mothers with children
under the age of 18), and persons belonging to particular racial groups.
Research in Canada and other countries has demonstrated that there is an
important connection between social exclusion, poor health and “justiciable
problems”59 and that this is a dynamic process whereby unsolved legal
problems can serve to further marginalize and exclude vulnerable
individuals and groups.60 An English report concluded that the lack of
access to legal assistance is a factor in bringing about or maintaining
social exclusion:
A lack of access to reliable legal advice can be a contributing factor in
creating and maintaining social exclusion. Poor access to advice has
meant that many people have suffered because they have been unable
to enforce their legal rights. 61

Similar findings were made on a global scale by the United Nations
Development Program’s Commission on Legal Empowerment of the
Poor in its recent report entitled Making the Law Work for Everyone
Volume I.62
The dimensions of this national problem give rise to serious legal
issues about access to justice. The failures of governments to adequately
respond to this crisis create an imperative for novel legal strategies.
Although right to counsel cases play an important role in ensuring that
an individual’s right to legal assistance is enforced in some circumstances,
these cases are incapable of addressing the constitutionality of a
59
Here the term “justiciable problem” is used to denote a problem with a legal aspect and a
potential legal solution, but one that may be resolved, possibly more appropriately, by other means.
60
For an excellent overview of this research and a presentation of preliminary Canadian
data see Ab Currie, “Civil Justice Problems and the Disability and Health Status of Canadians” in
N.J. Balmer, A. Buck, P. Pleasence, eds., Transforming Lives: Law and Social Process (UK: Legal
Services Commission, 2007).
61
Lord Chancellor’s Department and Law Centres Federation, Legal Advice and Services:
A Pathway Out of Social Exclusion (London: Lord Chancellor’s Department, 2001), at 11.
62
The report is available online at: Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor
<http://www.undp.org/legalempowerment/report/index.html>.
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government’s actions and failures to act and leave the legal aid schemes
qua governmental scheme immune from constitutional review by the
courts.
The individual right to publicly funded counsel approach was
developed in the criminal law context. It does not provide a suitable
means of determining the parameters of the constitutional right to civil
legal aid. In particular, the following limitations are inherent in the
individual right to counsel approach in the non-criminal law context:












it is exceedingly difficult for an individual to make a claim for statefunded counsel where the state is not a party to the proceeding, as
this will generally require initiating a separate action;
it is similarly difficult for an individual to make a claim for statefunded counsel in an administrative hearing as this would also
require initiating a separate action;
this approach is an uneconomical use of judicial resources because
an individual case is limited to the specific circumstances and results
only in an individual remedy and not a policy change, therefore the
same issue is likely to be re-litigated over and over again;
it is a fundamentally unfair approach because unrepresented
individuals are placed in a position where they must make complex
legal arguments;
this approach results in a complete lack of protection afforded to
“invisible claimants”, i.e., those individuals who abandon their legal
claims and the assertion of constitutional rights because the justice
system is simply too daunting without legal assistance which they
cannot afford; and
the individual right to counsel cases are generally founded
exclusively on a violation of section 7 of the Charter, but there are
strong arguments to be made under other constitutional provisions.
These novel causes of action are beyond the capacity of the
individual litigant in part because they require evidence that is
beyond the knowledge of an individual litigant. Whereas in the
criminal context where the jurisprudence is mature, advocacy groups
can provide self-represented litigants with a template to make a
“Rowbotham Application” for state-funded counsel. Such a
straightforward approach is currently not available in civil matters
because of the novelty of potential claims in for example, family law
or poverty law matters.
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Even in the criminal legal aid context, the courts have noted that
individual right to counsel cases do not challenge the constitutionality of
the legal aid system but only whether the individual’s Charter right was
violated.63 Different legal considerations apply to determining whether
counsel must be appointed to represent a person in a particular case than
would apply to a determination of whether a government program is
unconstitutional. In a right to counsel application, the focus is necessarily
on the problems of the individual, not the system. The onus is on the
claimant to prove his or her own lack of capacity in the specific
circumstances of his or her case rather than to prove that omissions in
the legal aid system are unconstitutional.
Furthermore, individual right to counsel cases are often not resolved
in a timely fashion. This further contributes to immunizing governmental
action and inaction from constitutional review. For example, in G. (J.),64
the trial judge did not make her decision on the right to counsel motion
until a year after the hearing on the merits of the underlying case for
which counsel was sought. For this reason, the Supreme Court of Canada
characterized the issues related to the right to counsel in civil matters as
“evasive of review” and noted that “the moving party is no better off
than he or she would have been had the motion not been brought to
begin with”.65 This was the primary reason that the Court decided the
constitutional issues raised in that case despite the fact that they were
moot.66 Additionally, the governments can avoid constitutional review of
the operation of civil legal aid systems by settling with individual
claimants thereby rendering the right to counsel applications moot. This
settlement strategy was employed in British Columbia and was one of
the contributing factors to the CBA’s decision to proceed with a
systemic claim.67
Another important distinction is that while right to counsel cases are
brought within the purview of section 7, the allegation of systemic
discrimination is central to the CBA’s case. An analysis of systemic
discrimination requires a perspective, supported by evidence, that is
63

Québec (Procureur général) c. C. (R.), [2003] J.Q. no. 7541, [2003] R.J.Q. 2027, at
paras. 82 and 113 (Que. C.A.).
64
Supra, note 41.
65
Id., at para. 46.
66
Id., at para. 84, per Lamer C.J.C.
67
The CBA relies on evidence filed by the British Columbia Public Interest Advocacy
Centre’s experience in trying to bring a test case on the right to counsel in civil welfare fraud
proceedings in its attempts to resist the motions to strike its claim.
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beyond the specific circumstance of the single perpetrator and the single
victim. Systemic discrimination is concerned with the cumulative
negative effect of government conduct on individuals or groups and
requires systemic remedies.68 Individual right to counsel cases are
analogous to the limited approach to accommodation in human rights
cases that has been rejected by the Supreme Court of Canada in favour
of a systemic approach that extends to scrutiny of the system, policy or
program as a whole.69 Courts should be particularly concerned about
shielding systemic discrimination from judicial scrutiny.70 A sole focus
on individual right to counsel cases will leave the web of exclusions and
restrictions in legal aid schemes beyond the reach of the Constitution.
The mismatch between a case-by-case approach limited to particular
circumstances and systemic problems was addressed in Chaoulli v.
Quebec (Attorney General),71 wherein public interest standing was
granted to permit a systemic challenge to proceed. In Chaoulli, the trial
judge found that neither of the public interest litigants had been directly
affected by the waiting lists at issue or by delays in receiving treatment.
Instead, they were asserting that they and their families would have
better and more timely access to medical services but for a legislative
prohibition on private medical insurance. The evidence was presented in
a systemic form: doctors testified about the extent of waiting lists and
expert witnesses expressed opinions on the effect private insurance
would have on the public health system. The trial judge found no actual
breaches of section 7 on the evidence before her, but potential and
imminent breaches (which she held were saved by section 1).72 At the
Supreme Court, the fullest account of the systemic nature of Chaoulli
and the distinction between an individual constitutional challenge and a
systemic challenge is provided by Binnie J. in his consideration of the
issue of standing (dissenting on the merits but not on this issue):
… the appellants advance the broad claim that the Quebec health plan
is unconstitutional for systemic reasons. They do not limit themselves
to the circumstances of any particular patient. Their argument is not
limited to a case-by-case consideration. They make the generic
68
Canadian National Railway Co. v. Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission),
[1987] S.C.J. No. 42, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1114, at 1138-39 (S.C.C.), per Dickson C.J.C. for the Court.
69
BCGSEU, supra, note 53.
70
Id., per McLachlin J., as she then was, for the Court, at para. 42.
71
[2005] S.C.J. No. 33, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791 (S.C.C) [hereinafter “Chaoulli”].
72
Chaoulli c. Québec (Procureure générale), [2000] J.Q. no. 479, [2000] R.J.Q. 786, at
paras. 19-23, 38 (Que. C.S.).
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argument that Quebec’s chronic waiting lists destroy Quebec’s
legislative authority to draw the line against private health insurance.
From a practical point of view, while individual patients could be
expected to bring their own cases to court if they wished to do so, it
would be unreasonable to expect a seriously ailing person to bring a
systemic challenge to the whole health plan, as was done here. The
material, physical and emotional resources of individuals who are ill,
and quite possibly dying, are likely to be focussed on their own
circumstances. In this sense, there is no other class of persons that is
more directly affected and that could be expected to undertake the
lengthy and no doubt costly systemic challenge to single-tier medicine.
Consequently, we agree that the appellants in this case were rightly
granted public interest standing. However, the corollary to this ruling is
that failure by the appellants in their systemic challenge would not
foreclose constitutional relief to an individual based on, and limited to,
his or her particular circumstances. 73 (emphasis added)

The CBA has argued that its action is analogous to, and consistent
with this holding. Like in Chaoulli, the rationale for the systemic claim
is also based on a recognition of the fact that many poor people who
require legal aid are vulnerable and are living in marginal and
constrained circumstances that give rise to significant barriers to their
participation in litigation. In its claim, the CBA relies on evidence
concerning the vulnerabilities of poor people, including that:










many are reliant on social assistance or disability benefits, and are
constantly struggling to meet the basic needs of themselves and their
children;
in addition to being poor, they are disproportionately members of
other groups that suffer discrimination, including single mothers,
people with disabilities, and members of racial minorities, which
affects their access to employment and basic services such as
housing;
for many, comprehension of legal problems is hampered by low
levels of education, illiteracy, mental disability, or the fact that
English is not their first language;
they suffer from high levels of stress and poor health;
they have very little influence in the democratic process;
social assistance recipients are afraid to become involved in legal
disputes and litigation with the government, either as defendants or
73

Chaoulli, supra, note 71, at para. 189.
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plaintiffs (or petitioners or respondents), for fear that it will
jeopardize their benefits and their relationships with government
staff who are the gatekeepers of those benefits; and
social assistance recipients who are single mothers are afraid to
become involved in legal disputes and litigation with the
government, either as defendants or plaintiffs (or petitioners or
respondents), for fear that existing arrangements for custody, access,
and maintenance of children will be disturbed and that their children
will be exposed to the risk of apprehension. In some cases, there is a
fear of generating animosity from a former spouse.74

In a perverse way, the Court’s obiter comments in Christie about the
inadequacy of the evidentiary record provide further support for the
systemic case.75 Mr. Christie had brought evidence about the impact of
the tax on provincial legal services on his clients and his own practice
and the lower courts accepted this evidence but the Supreme Court
opined that much more would be needed to prove that the tax on legal
services was unconstitutional. Mr. Christie was in a position of relative
advantage over a person of modest means who requires legal assistance.
It is difficult to imagine how an individual poor person could have the
resources, willingness and ability to bring sufficient evidence about the
deficiencies in a legal aid scheme and their impact. Concerns about
ensuring the adequacy of an evidentiary record in constitutional cases
would appear to lend support to the CBA’s public interest test case given
that it is better placed to marshall the necessary proof of constitutional
violations.
2. The Fate of the Systemic Case
At present, the CBA case stands dismissed. The CBA is in the
process of considering its options but remains committed to a litigation
strategy to broaden judicial recognition of the constitutional right to civil
legal aid.76 I am too close to this matter to provide a detailed analysis of
the specific reasons for dismissing the case. However, at this juncture it
is appropriate to step back and review the decisions of both the

74

See CBA Statement of Claim, supra, note 58, at paras. 13-20.
Christie, supra, note 56, at para. 28.
76
After this paper was completed, the CBA sought and was denied leave to appeal to the
Supreme Court of Canada in this matter: [2008] S.C.C.A. No. 185 (S.C.C.).
75

590

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2008), 42 S.C.L.R. (2d)

Chambers judge and the Court of Appeal in the larger context of the
debate over the justiciability of access to justice issues.
The interrelated issues of public interest standing, the systemic
nature of the claim, and whether the CBA is required to plead material
facts relating to individual circumstances together led to the dismissal of
the case. These issues can be seen as reflecting one big knot of judicial
concern about whether the CBA’s claim is a real and substantial legal
controversy that is amenable to judicial determination. These concerns
are somewhat difficult to understand in the context of the robust
Canadian jurisprudence on justiciability in constitutional cases.
The Supreme Court of Canada has held that it is the role and
responsibility of the courts to determine objectively and impartially
whether governmental choices fall within the limiting framework of the
Constitution. In constitutional cases, the role of the court extends beyond
its traditional function of resolving disputes between private parties, to
the regulation of government behaviour.77 This function recognizes that
all citizens have an interest in ensuring that governments behave in a
constitutional manner, and that is there is a “fundamental right of the
public to government in accordance with the law”.78 These same
principles supply the rationale for the granting of public interest standing
in constitutional cases.
A court cannot decline jurisdiction over a matter merely because it
believed the matter better resolved through the political process.79 The
court is the “constitutionally mandated referee” and if the courts deferred
to government on matters of policy in the context of constitutional
challenges it would render Charter rights and protections meaningless
and without a remedy.80 The fact that a claim may have some political
content does not render it injusticiable. The legislatures and the courts
have independent obligations to ensure that legislation and government
action conforms to the Constitution. In Chaoulli, McLachlin C.J.C.
wrote that:
77
Operation Dismantle v. Canada, [1985] S.C.J. No. 22, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “Operation Dismantle”]; Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v. NAPE, [2004] S.C.J. No.
61, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 381 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “NAPE”]; Chaoulli, supra, note 71; Vriend, supra,
note 44; RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1995] S.C.J. No. 68, [1995] 3 S.C.R.
199 (S.C.C.).
78
Canadian Council of Churches v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration),
[1992] S.C.J. No. 5, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 236, at para. 31 (S.C.C.).
79
Operation Dismantle, supra, note 77, at para. 38, per Dickson C.J.C., at para. 64, per
Wilson J.
80
NAPE, supra, note 77, at paras. 105, 111.
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While the decision about the type of health care system Quebec should
adopt falls to the Legislature of that province, the resulting legislation,
like all laws, is subject to constitutional limits, including those imposed
by s. 7 of the Charter. The fact that the matter is complex, contentious
or laden with social values does not mean that the courts can abdicate
the responsibility vested in them by our Constitution to review
legislation for Charter compliance when citizens challenge it. …81

Similarly, the CBA does not seek to not tell the government
defendants what type of legal aid regime it must create, rather it seeks
constitutional review of specified aspects of the existing governmental
scheme in British Columbia and a declaration of unconstitutionality. The
Statement of Claim contains allegations of the actual deleterious effects
of the current civil legal aid regime in this province. There is nothing
hypothetical, speculative or abstract about the facts upon which this case
is founded that would render it injusticiable. The claim is not that the
government scheme might lead to a violation of constitutional rights, but
that it is in violation of the Constitution because it systemically
discriminates against poor people. Refining the parameters of the
constitutional right to legal assistance and representation is not a task
that falls outside the institutional competence of the courts. Even prior to
the adoption of the Charter, courts asserted their inherent jurisdiction to
order state-funded counsel in some cases. While the CBA’s claim seeks
constitutional review from a broader, systemic perspective, the subject
matter is one which courts are eminently qualified to consider.
Despite the fact that the CBA’s claim can be fully squared within
existing precedent on justiciability, there are clear indications of judicial
nervousness about the breadth of the implications of addressing access to
justice issues. The Supreme Court of Canada’s decisions in Little Sisters
and Christie82 are rife with judicial apprehension about the perception
that the courts would be seen to be constitutionally mandating a “parallel
system of legal aid”.83 In its claim, the CBA is not asking the Court to
“bring an alternative and extensive legal aid system into being”.84 British
Columbia and Canada brought the system into being several decades
ago. The CBA is asking the Court to do what it alone is constitutionally
81
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empowered to do, to review the existing scheme in British Columbia for
constitutional compliance. This is in no way an “imprudent and
inappropriate judicial overreach”.85 An eventual decision on the
constitutionality of the scheme and appropriate remedy would leave the
governments the needed margin of manoeuvre to fulfil their
responsibilities to devise efficient and effective schemes within the
clarified constitutional parameters.
In G. (J.),86 the Supreme Court confirmed that government has a
wide latitude in selecting the means to implement constitutional obligations.
However, the Court also clearly held that where the government has
adopted a specific policy of not providing legal aid in situations where it
is required by the Constitution, the government will be found to be in
violation of the Constitution. The CBA’s case is fully consistent with
this approach. The CBA claims that the effect of the defendant’s actions
and failures to act is that legal aid is not available in situations in which
it is required by the Constitution. The CBA does not argue for a specific
delivery system for legal aid in B.C. It is searching to define one aspect
of the constitutional core of access to justice, that is a type of minimum
constitutional standard for the provision of civil legal aid.
As Professor Sossin has pointed out: “There is a certain uncomfortable
irony in a case denying the right to lawyers to argue for better access to
justice”.87 However, irony may not be a strong enough term to describe
the status quo. Statistics that have been released since the CBA launched
its case in June 2005, reveal that the situation of poor people in need of
civil legal assistance has steadily deteriorated. Despite the relative
strength of the provincial economy, B.C. is now number 1 in poverty in
Canada88 and is near the bottom of provinces in the provision of civil
legal aid when measured on a per capita basis.89 Dismissing the serious
issues raised in this case without a trial has the effect of immunizing the
alleged constitutional deficiencies of the civil legal aid system in this
province from judicial review thereby perpetuating the disadvantage and
85
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social exclusion experienced by poor people. Viewed from this context,
it appears that inflated justiciability concerns have led not merely to an
ironic outcome, but to an unjust one.

